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FOREWORD

This Information Bulletin is

of

one

a

series of reports

prepared

by the Community and Economic Task Force of the Urban Consortium under
a grant from the Economic
Development Administration's Economic
Research Division.
The overall purpose of this project is to facil
itate the active involvement of local government officials in the eco
nomic research and development process and to make the Economic Devel
opment Administration's research program responsive to the needs of
large urban jurisdictions.
The

which is

bulletins in
made up

the

of local

series deal with topics that the Task Force,

officials,

has

identified

cerns. Information Bulletins were developed
topic s :

on each

as

Local Business

•

Early Warning

•

The Impact
Development

of Local Tax Policy

•

The Impact
Development

of Federal Fiscal Policies

•

The State's
Government

Role in Urban Economic Development:
Perspective

•

The Role

Employment

Retention

con

Strategies

•

and

priority

of the following

Information Systems for Business Retention
on Urban

Economic

on Urban

Economic

An Urban

of the Arts in Urban Economic Development

overviews, from the
The Information Bulletins provide nontechnical
government perspective, of issues, problems, and current
for dealing with important urban economic development con
approaches
cerns. I am certain that local economic development practitioners and
officials at all levels of government will find the bulletins informa

local

tive.

Victor A. Hausner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Devel
Policy and Planning, EDA, guided the project.
I wish to give

opment

special thanks

vision,

and

to Jeanne McFarland, Chief of the Economic
to Gerald Duskin, the project officer.

Robert T. Hall
Assistant Secretary
for Economic Development
U.

S. Department

of

Commerce

Research Di

PREFACE

This Information Bulletin is
munity

and Economic

Development

one of several prepared by the Com
Task Force of the Urban Consortium.

The Urban Consortium is a formal organization of the nation's
twenty-eight largest cities and nine large urban counties, which have
joined together to increase the relevance of national research and

to the priority needs of urban areas.
The Con
unique
sortium provides a
forum through which urban governments can
work to define their common needs, identify high priority topics for
participate in cooperative research with
research and development,
Federal agencies and researchers, facilitate demonstrations, improve
the transfer of information to and among jurisdictions,
and provide
useful feedback to Federal agencies on proposed initiatives.
development

programs

The Community and Economic Development Task Force of the Urban
Consortium is one of nine Consortium Task Forces which have been or
ganized to focus on priority urban R&D issues in nine functional areas.
Through the Task Force, senior-level local government officials work to
encourage research, development and demonstration activities which ad
dress priority community and economic development needs of large urban
governments.
Broad areas of interest include: community development,
urban economic development, planning, neighborhood revitalizat ion and
housing.
Each

Information Bulletin covers

a

priority local

government

con

First, it provides the
designed to serve two purposes.
members of the Task Force with a common information base from which an
overall R&D agenda and specific research initiatives can be developed.
Second, it provides government officials, the research community, and
others with a general statement of a priority need area, and an indica
tion of the Consortium perspective and interests in seeking research
resources to solve a priority problem.
cern;

it is

Information Bulletin concisely states the problem

and major is
need statement; explores the state-of-the-art
and practice;
identifies model practices, resource persons, and mate
rials; and suggests potential research initiatives to respond to unmet
needs,
In many instances, an Information Bulletin has served
any.
as a catalyst for local government collaboration with Federal agencies
and the research community in addressing a local government concern.
An

sues

associated

with

a

if

of the Community and Economic Development Task Force and
of these bulletins have been supported by the Economic
Development Administration, Economic Research Division, under grant
#ERD-684-G-79-21
The help and support of Victor Hausner,
(99-7-13493).
EDA's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Development Policy and
Planning, Jeanne McFarland, Chief of EDA's Economic Research Division,
and Gerald Duskin, Project Officer for this project,
is gratefully
The work

the development

acknowledged

.
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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

This Information Bulletin explores the effects of local tax policy on ur
development. The paper is practitioner-oriented
and addresses
of how local officials might best think through the advisability
of adjusting local taxes to stimulate community job formation.

ban economic
the question

considerations relevant to evaluating the costs and benefits of pro
tax policy changes are set forth in section
The author explores
three sets of questions which the local practitioner would do well to consider
in evaluating tax incentives for economic development: (a) can the incentive
reasonably be expected to have a positive impact on total employment?
(b) is
the program objective to attract new jobs, to retain old iobs that otherwise
might be lost, to cause existing firms to expand, to increase job opportuni
ties in depressed areas of the city, or to cause a physical renovation of com
mercial and industrial establishments?
(c) what are the implications of the
program for local government revenues and costs?
The

II.

posed

III

reviews local tax policy reforms used to influence urban eco
including property tax incentives, tax increment financing, gen
eral tax reductions, metropolitan tax base sharing and structural changes in
the local tax code, including reduction of the nonresidential component of the
property tax, and the possibility of substituting land value taxation as an
alternative to the property tax levy.

Section

nomic

change,

Section IV reviews the existing literature on the effects of taxation on
industrial location, and the evidence surrounding the fiscal and job genera
While much of the existing liter
tion impacts of specific local tax reforms.
exert, at best, only minimal influence
interregional industrial location decisions, case study data provide some
support for the belief that local tax policy reforms can stimulate local eco

ature suggests that tax policy changes
on

nomic

development.

Section V proposes a research agenda to improve existing knowledge about
Priority research
to use local tax policy to enhance city economies.
needs include: the development of comparative case studies on the net job and
investment impacts of various tax subsidies; analyses of the differential im
pacts of tax incentives on job attraction and job retention efforts; the esti
mation of the effects of subsidized projects on local service employment and
investment; studies of the local revenue and expenditure impacts of tax abate
ment and tax increment financing efforts; research on the interaction
among
competing and reinforcing Federal, state and local tax incentives; and analy
ses of the effects of tax incentives intended to develop the local economy in
impacted or blighted areas.
how

Sections VI and VII provide
bibliography.

lected

additional

information

resources

and

a

se
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I.

INTRODUCTION

of the most often debated but least understood aspects of urban eco
development is the effect of taxation on industry location decisions.
Do tax subsidies actually attract new jobs that otherwise would have gone
elsewhere or are taxes so minor a cost consideration that these subsidies are
unnecessary giveaways? This brief paper will not resolve the debate — the
present state of knowledge simply won't permit that — but it will lay out what
seem to be the relevant issues and the conditions under which adjustments in
local tax policy are likely to have a positive effect on urban economic devel
opment.
The tone of the paper is meant to be descriptive and practitioneroriented and to directly raise the question of how should local government of
ficials think through the advisability of adjusting various local taxes to
One

nomic

stimulate local

In

iob

formation.

section, the set of considerations relevant to evaluating the
benefits of various tax policy changes is reviewed. Section
is
a brief review of the practice in various states and local areas.
We then
turn to a summary of the record of success with such schemes, insofar as that
A concluding
section sums up by discussing the con
record can be determined.
ditions under which subsidy programs are likely to be more or less successful.
costs

An

the next

and

addendum

could

fill

III

to the paper lays out a research agenda which, if undertaken,
in some of the important gaps in our knowledge of this subject.

are
Many topics, important to the issue of urban economic development,
Because the subject of this inquiry is local
not covered in this discussion.
government tax policies, we do not consider Federal incentives for urban eco
nomic development or state government incentive programs other than enabling
The scope of this paper is further narrowed by
actions for local government.
the exclusive concern with tax policies, to the neglect of capital subsidies
In
and other devices which local government may use to attract industry.
short, this discussion is mostly about property taxation and the use of prop
erty tax policy in urban economic development.!/

1/ For a good review of the full range of state and local government
incentive programs, see Larry Schroeder and Paul Blackley, "State and Local
Government Locational Incentive Programs and Small Business in Region II,"
Paper prepared for the Small Business Administration Project, "The Regional
Environments for Small Business and Entrepreneurship , " edited by David
Greytak, Metropolitan Studies Program, The Maxwell School, Syracuse
University, September 1979.

II.

LOCAL

TAX POLICY

ISSUES

in local tax policy to stimulate job growth go on
Unfortunately, these policy changes are more often based on
analysis and anecdotal evidence about the success of tax incentives
hard study and a full consideration of the more subtle implications

city:

Adjustments

in every

superficial
than

on

of such

Programs such as tax abatements are politically attractive, because
they give the appearance that something is being done, and can be associated
with the opening of a new firm or plant even if the incentive actually played
Critics of the tax relief programs see them
no role in the location decision.
gift
industry
Proponents,
more
than
a
to
from the city's taxpayers.
as little
on the other hand, argue that tax subsidy programs are essential for attract
ing jobs.
They lower the relative cost of doing business and the property tax
revenues foregone are more than made up for by the increased revenue generated
by the increased level of economic activity.

policies.

Regardless of which view is correct, the analysis underlying the formula.tion of most tax abatement programs has been shoddy. The issues involved in
formulating local tax policy changes to attract jobs are quite complicated and
require a careful and full statement of objectives at the outset. Three sets
can
of issues would seem most important in formulating such a policy:
(a)
the incentive reasonably be expected to have a positive effect on total em
ployment?
(b) is the program objective to attract new jobs, retain old jobs
that otherwise might be lost, to cause existing firms to expand, to increase
job opportunities in depressed areas of the city, or to cause a physical
renovation of commercial and industrial establishments?
(c) what are the
implications of the program for local government revenues and costs?

Estimating Potential Employment Effects
tax relief measures, undertaken by local government, generate new
in the local area? The statistical evidence, reviewed in the next
section, does not bare a record of proven success.
Indeed, most studies of
the effect of taxation on industry location indicate a minor influence, except
for the effects of variations in tax rates within regions. Yet these studies
are flawed enough in their methodology that one cannot jump quickly to the
Indeed, some studies have
conclusion that local tax policy doesn't matter.
found evidence that taxes might have a positive effect on firm location, but
again the evidence is far from conclusive.
Can

jobs

Whether the level and structure of taxes have an effect on industry
location decisions is probably less important than whether politicians believe
A reasonable projection might be for a growing use
and act as though they do.
First, the U.S. economy will grow
of tax incentives at the local level.
slower in the coming decade and therefore the natural growth in employment
will be lower. Few politicians can easily accept such external limitations on
local economic growth and will attempt to gain back a larger share of the pie
through various incentive devices. This reaction will be especially pro-

in the declining regions as governments attempt to hold on to. a con
tracting job base. In short, the justification for using tax incentives probably will have little to do with any knowledge of their possible success but rathwill be used out of frustration; no matter how marginal the impact of such
it at least represents some action which local governments can take.
programs,
nounced

If such a view of the future is reasonably correct, it would seem worth
rethinking the less obvious implications of the job-creating powers of tax
incentive programs. Even if a tax incentive does attract economic activity the
Consider these complications
estimation of employment impacts is complicated.
in terms of an example.
Assume that a tax incentive program is responsible for
attracting a new manufacturing firm which provides 100 jobs. One might argue
that the total employment gain is on the order of 100 jobs plus some number of
new jobs induced
in the local services sector. There is debate about the size
of the multiplier effect in such cases (the number of new service sector jobs
for each new manufacturing job created) but for the sake of illustration, assume
jobs. If these new
a multiplier of 1.0 which implies 100 new service sector
jobs are permanent, the local tax incentive program would at first blush seem to
have created 200 new jobs.
It remains only to determine if the amount of the
property tax cost of the incentive is made up by the additional revenues
generated from other taxes

and

charges.

Most analyses, especially those done by the jurisdiction offering the
Yet conclusions drawn from so superficial an
abatement, would go no further.
analysis are grossly misleading. First there are problems with using a
multiplier to estimate new jobs created in the service sector. The estimate of
100 induced jobs in the local services sector assumes
that there is not already
losing
population, excess
capacity
in
that
In
cities
that
are
excess
sector.
likely
capacity in the service sector is quite
to exist.
For example,
employment losses in grocery stores, department stores, and personal and
business service establishments are likely to lag the employment losses in the
basic sector; hence the demands of new workers could be absorbed without
This is particularly the case for
increases in service sector employment.
government sector employment; i.e., the new firm and its new families are not
likely to require new policemen and teachers in a declining city.
the city
population is growing, there is likely to be a stronger multiplier effect on
local service employment, though again the effect may be lagged. The situation
is even more complicated in the case of cities where there is substantial
jurisdictional fragmentation.
the abatement attracts a new firm to a city
location, but many of the workers commute from the suburbs, much of the service
sector employment gain is likely to occur outside the jurisdiction offering the
tax abatement.
The conclusion to be drawn here is that the multiplier effects
must be carefully considered.
In the case of declining cities which are ringed
by growing suburbs, these effects are likely to be quite small.

If

If

an even more important consideration than the indirect employment
is the need to measure net job increases resulting from the incentive.
The 100 jobs created by attracting the new firm in the example above may be
partially offset by lost jobs in competing firms; hence the net job gain may

Perhaps

effects

-

3

-

~"

/

less than the 100 implied. The same kind of counting error is often
For example, if an Urban
made with respect to Federal revitalizat ion programs.
Development Action Grant (UDAG) were to induce renovation and expansion of a
Syracuse hotel, the actual net effect would be the new jobs gained in that hotel
less the jobs lost in older and now even less competitive hotels. Observers in
every city can point to the relationship between the opening of new retail chain
stores and the closing of local and family-owned businesses.
Indeed, if there
are job increases to be associated with local tax policy changes, then there are
also job decreases to be associated with these changes.
be much

In

sum,

the

job gains

with attracting

associated

new economic

activity to

Every effort should be
an area may be considerably less than they appear.
made to estimate net job gains and service sector employment increases
in or
der to properly evaluate the benefits of an abatement program.
any kind of

If

drawn here, it is that, cet. par., declining cities located
jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan areas are likely to benefit less from
these programs are instrumental in attracting new
abatement programs, even
firms. A second implication is that the employment generation effects are
likely to be greater
the attracted firm does not compete in a local market;
i.e.,
a new hotel is built, some jobs in older hotels may be displaced, but
a manufacturer selling in a national market is attracted, the displacement
effects are likely to be much smaller.

conclusion can

be

in

if

if

if

if

Defining Program Objectives

It is late to call for a re-thinking of objectives in formulating local
tax policy to stimulate economic development. Yet, in their haste to do some
thing to make such programs politically acceptable and to provide the neces
local officials have oftentimes bypassed a thinki .g through of
sary compromises,
As a result, there is a substantial gap between
the goals of these programs.
the design of these programs and their actual effects.
Local tax
A major problem is in the area of retention vs. attraction.
policy to stimulate job growth usually means the offering of some forrd of tax
incentive to induce new employment opportunities; i.e., the focus is most often
on investment in a new plant or a new expansion.
Much less atter :ion seems to
have been paid to providing a general package of incentives or general business
tax relief to retain existing firms which may be contemplating a move, layoffs,
or even closure.
The failure to formulate local tax policies which concentrate
the
on retention may be a major mistake on the part of many local governments
declining regions of the country.
In many older U.S. cities, inertia may be one
of the few remaining comparative advantages. The relocation decision is a hard
and most businesses probably want to avoid the
one, fraught with uncertainties,
In any case, the formulatirr*
costs of moving part or all of their operations.
policies
and the evaluation of
to
stimulate
local
tax
economic
development
of
the success of those policies demand a clear statement of objectives with
respect to retention vs. attraction.

-

4

-

The greater interest in attracting than retaining is not hard to under
stand.
The gross employment-generating effects from local tax relief programs
designed to hold jobs in the city will probably be smaller than in the case of
tax incentives to attract new industries.
They certainly will be less visi
ble. A tax incentive to new firms in the area might be associated with some
A
net employment gain and with some induced local sector employment gains.
plant expansion of an existing firm would have a similar effect because new
In both cases, however, the net employment
workers would be bid into the area.
gains (including the local sector) will be offset if the new employees are
already local area residents, i.e., if they are drawn from a pool of the
This is more likely to be the case in the older and declining
unemployed.
regions of the country where surplus labor accumulates as industry moves out.
In the growing areas, the net gain may be much greater because of the possible
shortage of skilled labor and because of less excess capacity in the service
sector. The new firm attraction strategy also has the very great advantage of
its political visibility. A general tax relief may well help keep existing
The attrac
industries in the city but such effects are not easily discerned.
tion of a new firm, announced with appropriate fanfare and somehow linked to a
favorable incentive, produces much greater political mileage.

If

is designed to retain existing firms, the gains
to be more modest and surely will be less visible.
The only sense
in which new jobs are gained is that job losses from the closure or contrac
tion of a plant didn't occur, and some local service sector ]obs were not
lost. Moreover, the subsidy will probably be more permanent than temporary
since a lowering of tax costs was necessary to correct a comparative disad
side, the reten
vantage of either the region or the firm.
On the advantages
The firm is already located
tion strategy may lead to much greater success.
in the local area and moving and decision costs are high. New locations must
Will the
always raise many uncertainties from the point of view of the firm:
labor supply remain adequate and will it be productive?
Will energy supplies
From the point of view of the city government,
be adequate and at what cost?
(water, sewer, roads, power, etc.) is already in place to
the infrastructure
serve the existing firm whereas adjustments may be required for new plants.
are

a

likely

tax subsidy program

abatement programs suggests yet another set of objec
to urban revitalization.
Some incentive programs are
targeted on "blighted" areas within cities, yet it is unclear whether the ob
jective is to create new jobs for the poor or simply to upgrade buildings in
dilapidated neighborhoods.
Only the latter would seem a feasible objective of
local government tax policies.
The

design of

some

tives, those related

Public Costs

and

Benefits

The primary objective of tax incentive programs is to increase employ
ment, but always implicit is the intention of improving the fiscal position of
the local government.
attempt to stimulate
Why else would a local government
local economic development?
the goal were no more than to increase job
opportunities, program responsibility should be with the Federal, state or

If

-

5

-

regional government but not with the local government . What city has
ever produced an abatement scheme for the private sector which carried a resi
The possibility of leakages would seem to make it a losing
dency requirement?
proposition for local governments to run budget deficits to finance employment
generation schemes; i.e., new jobs in the city may be taken by suburban resi
even

dent

s

.2/

fiscal costs

The

viability

and

benefits of abatements

are

essential

to

evaluating

Simply put, the abate
of such programs for local governments.
ment is a fiscal success if the sum of the property tax revenue loss due to
the abatement plus the increased public expenditure due to the new activity is
less than the increased revenue generated by the new activity. 3/ The attrac
tion of a new firm may increase net employment but may not satisfy this condi
the

tion.

revenue side, the tax relief itself is a loss but it is not easily
the incentive were required to bid the firm into the area, there
implicit
no
loss because without the incentive there would be no rirm to
is
tax.
there was a displacement of other firms as a result of the attrac
tion, the property taxes which the displaced firms would have paid may prop
erly be counted as a loss and offset against the taxes actually paid by the
the tax incentive was unnecessary to attract the firm in
new firm. 4/
place,
the entire amount of each year's abated tax may be viewed as
the first
On

the

measured.

If

If

If

a

loss.

This direct loss due to the tax abatement may be made up by increased
property, sales, and income taxes attributable to the new employees.
For
cities levying income and sales taxes, such offsetting gains are possible.
However, many local governments — particularly cities — depend primarily if not
exclusively on property taxes, hence gain little revenue from increased income
and consumption in the area.
In a sense, the sales and income tax benefits
from tax incentives may spill out to state and county governments, which are
much more

likely

to levy

sales

and

income taxes.

Whether the revenue gains will offset the revenue costs depends on the
net job gain, the average earnings of new workers and the structure of the tax
Those cities which rely exclusively on property taxes might also bensystem.

2/ There is quite a long literature on the subject of local government's
role in stabilization policy. This is surveyed nicely in Wallace Oates,
Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt-Jovanovich , 1972), Chapters 1 and 2.
3/ This view may be overly restrictive in that local residents may be
to forego a fiscal surplus if it leads to deterioration of environ
mental quality. This issue is treated in William Fischel, "Fiscal and Envi
ronmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities,"
Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls, ed. by Edwin Mills and Wallace Oates
(Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington,
1975).

willing

4/

Some

abatement

programs

require partial property
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tax payments.

in

an indirect way if new employees increase housing demand and property
While
this might happen in the growing cities, it is less likely to
value.
In the latter case, new workers
happen in cities which are losing population.
replace
those leaving, hence no net addi
moving into the community may only
tion to the property tax rolls need occur. 5/ In either case there is the pos
sibility that new workers will live in jurisdictions other than the one in
which they work; hence the property tax benefits will again escape the govern
In general, the smaller the geoment which actually offers the inducement.
~1
graphic coverage of the government offering the incentive and the smaller the
scope of taxing power, the more likely are tax revenue benefits to spill out
to neighboring jurisdictions or higher level governments.
This does not augur _J
well for the use of local government tax measures to stimulate economic

efit in

activity.

Revenues are only one-half of the fiscal equation, and new industry is
also likely to cause public expenditures to rise. More workers mean more
-—^
families and a need for greater education, protection, sanitation and recrea
tional services. Here the declining cities may have an advantage since popu
lation losses may have left them with some idle capacity and therefore a very
low marginal cost of providing public services.
The opposite will be true for
growing cities that are already struggling to meet the increased service
The expenditure impact analysis becomes more
demands from recent in-migrants.
complicated if the characteristics of new families are considered; for
example, larger family size and lower income would appear to require greater
public sector costs relative to the property value increases they generate.

If

workers

live outside

city,

the

both

public servicing burdens

and
commuters to the
city impose a burden which may go uncompensated — increased automobile conges
tion and its attendant costs, fire and police protection needs at the work
site, etc. Moreover there are plant-related expenditures which may range from
needed water and power plant expansions to traffic control for delivery trucks
In this case, the older cities
to increased street maintenance, and so on.
is most obsolete would seem to face the greater cost in
whose infrastructure
new

tax benefits

creases

fall

on

the

resident jurisdiction.

However,

.

The net

fiscal

impact

of tax-induced

employment
than what is

increases

is not easily

ordinarily supposed.
determined and may be considerably less
the net fiscal impact is positive overall — i.e., the increased costs
Even
are less than the increased revenues — it does not necessarily follow that the
fiscal impact will be positive for every affected jurisdiction offering the
Throughout this discussion we have neglected the temporal aspects
incentive.
of the fiscal effects. It is quite likely that in the early years of the
abatements, the fiscal impact will be negative, reflecting the immediate tax
relief to the attracted firm and the immediate investments required by the
city to provide adequate infrastructure and supporting services. A more prop
er approach to evaluating fiscal impact would be to consider the longer term

if

costs

and

benefits.

5/ Other than that resulting from reassessment.
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III.

PRACTICE

LOCAL

tax policy might

be used to effect urban economic development
in a
approach would be to tax the community more heavily in
order to provide more adequate public services, i.e., general tax rate
increases and special assessment financing of certain capital improvements.
For many cities, particularly those in the growing regions of the country,
this is an important use of tax policy to stimulate economic development. In
the other regions of the country, where taxes are already inordinately high,
it would seem a less viable approach. A second set of local policies involves
providing direct financial assistance to businesses through landbanking,
low-cost loans or technical assistance in implementing development projects.
These are important, but not considered here.
Our concern is with that class
of tax policies whereby local governments reduce the effective tax rate in
order to stimulate economic activity.
This class of policies includes various
kinds of tax incentives, general tax reductions, and structural tax changes
which are designed to promote investments.

Local

number of ways.

One

In the next section, various kinds of property tax incentive programs are
We
then proceed to tax increment financing,, general tax
reduction, metropolitan tax base sharing and, finally, structural reforms
including land-value taxation.
The scope of this paper is not intentionally
limited to local property tax policy though, in fact, local governments make
relatively little use of other kinds of tax incentives.
considered.

Property Tax Abatements
The most common method of using local tax policy to stimulate economic
is to provide tax reductions for specified firms or types of
development
firms. For reductions granted by local governments, this invariably involves
property taxation.
Tax abatement programs fall into this category and are the
most dominant form of tax relief designed to stimulate business investment.
Such programs may vary widely in terms of the amount of tax relief offered,
the duration of the abatement period, program eligibility, and the development
Property tax abatements have in common the objective of decreasing the
agent.
operating costs of an investment during the years immediately following the
investment.
Whether or not this amounts to a substantial increase in the rate

of return to capital

is debatable.

Good, detailed reviews of the practice of tax abatement to stimulate lo
cal development are available elsewhere 6/ and no attempt is made here to de
scribe in any comprehensive way the current state of the practice.
Suffice to
say that the practice is growing, particularly local government tax abatements

6/ See , for example, "States and Urban Development," National Council for
Urban Economic Development Information Service, October 1975; Industrial De
velopment , Jan/Feb 1978; and Darwin Daicoff, An Economic Analysis of the Tax
Abatement Aspects of Kansas City Urban Redevelopment Projects, University of
Kansas (Kansas City: 1975) .
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industrial

development in "blighted" or designated redevel
These are granted at local initiative but require State govern
areas.
opment
The practice varies widely and there is not yet
ment enabling legislation.
enough of a record to gauge their success.

for commercial

and

Missouri and Ohio have comprehensive tax abatement programs for develop
of blighted areas within cities. Property tax abatements of up to 25
years may be granted on development property owned by limited dividend cor
porations.
A "property
tax in lieu" is paid on the predevelopment value of
the property; hence the abatement is on the growth in value which results from
the abatement.
Missouri (353 Urban Redevelopment Law) abates all real and
personal property taxes on improvements but not on land for the first 10 years
and forgives 50 percent of the tax on land and improvements
for the next 15
years. Ohio (impacted Cities Legislation) exempts only real property and
requires payment of a tax based on predevelopment value throughout the 20-year
abatement period. A second Ohio program (Senate Bill 251) allows municipali
ties to grant property tax relief — of up to 12 years — on improvements to real
property in designated "community reinvestment areas."

ment

two programs for local property tax relief.
Any firm
the State Corporate Tax Relief (job incentive) program may
also be exempted from 100 percent of the property tax increase due to the new
investment.
The exemption may hold for up to 10 years following the invest
following
The
ment.
table indicates the extent to which local governments
have used this tax incentive as of January 1979.7/
New

which

Type

York State has

qualifies for

Number

of Jurisdiction

Providing

Exemption for

No.

All

Counties

27

13

Cities

24

12

Towns

65

29

Villages

18

11

49

23

183

88

School

Districts

Total

100
10

Percent
Years

The other form of property tax abatement is in New York City where exemptions are available to commercial and industrial firms that undertake new con
struction or reconstruction.
New facilities must be constructed
on predomi
nantly vacant land according to plans approved by the New York City Industrial

7/ This description of the New York program is drawn from Schroeder and
Blackley, "State and Local Government Locational Incentive Programs and Small

Business

in Region

II,"

September

1979.
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and

Incentive Board (ICIB). The board must also approve recon
plans. There is some differential treatment between new and recon

Commercial

struction
structed property

and commercial
versus industrial property.
For new commer
the abatement is identical to that of the rest of the State,
i.e., a maximum of 50 percent in the first year declining by five percentage
points in each of the 9 subsequent years.
For new industrial or reconstructed
industrial or commercial facilities (where reconstruction amounts to more than
20 percent of assessed valuation at the time of application for eligibility),
the exemption is at 95 percent of the increase in value for the first year and
declines by five percentage points per year for each of the following 19
All urban and rural areas are eligible to participate in the program.
years.
Eligibility expires when the facility is no longer used for industrial or com
mercial purposes or after a 36-month construction period (although up to
14-month extensions may be given at the option of the NYC Industrial and Com

cial

property

mercial Incentive Board). 8/

New Jersey allows
and residential

of

cities

to provide tax incentives for com
investments in "areas in need of rehabili
tation." New projects and expansions of more than 30 percent are eligible for
The developers pay in-lieu of property tax
abatements for up to 15 years.
payments based upon 15 percent of the project's annual gross rent or 2 percent
According to a recent analysis of this pro
annually of the project's cost.
gram, Newark is the only New Jersey municipality to take advantage of the
abatement possibilities . 9/
The State

mercial,

industrial

Chicago has

a

new abatement program for areas of high unemployment
new construction and rehabilitation of commercial

includes both
industrial structures
for 10 years.

program

and

provides

for

a 40

percent preferential

.

The
and

assessment

Massachusetts has authorized non-profit, limited dividend corporations,
projects in selected areas. These
or cooperatives, to carry out redevelopment
8/ In July 1979 the Governor signed into law a change in the provisions
of the ICIB decreasing the length of the period for which projects would be
from local property taxes.
The limit on commercial construction was
exempt
decreased from 10 to 5 years and on commercial reconstruction and industrial
construction and reconstruction from 20 to 10 years. In addition, it created
for the
a new category of "specially needed" projects that would be eligible
longer abatement.
These are services that would have "an especially positive
impact on the... (local) economy" or projects built or reconstructed on water
front property. The legislation also excluded entirely projects used for
recreational purposes and eating establishments. (From a press release
City of New York,
(#79037) of the Office of Economic Development,
July 14, 1979.)
9/
Urban

Public

N.

Beer,

"New

Revitalizat ion,
and

Jersey's Business Property Tax
for New Jersey Affairs,

" Center

International

Affairs, Princeton University,

-
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Abatement
Woodrow

1978.

Program

and

Wilson School of

projects are exempt from property taxes but a negotiated payment in lieu of
essentially covers pre-abatement taxes.
taxes is made.
The negotiated
payment
There is a similar provision in the New Jersey program.
Tax Increment

Financing

Tax increment financing might be classified as an incentive similar to a
tax abatement in that it gives up a potential property tax revenue increase
which might be used for general purposes and thereby raises the possibility of
financing
a city fiscal loss.
The specific practice under which tax increment
operates can vary widely across states but the general approach is much the
project will increase future property val
same everywhere . 10/
A development
The local government estimates
ues and property taxes in the project area.
these future increases and borrows against them to finance public investments
in the project area. Whereas tax abatements return part or all of the in
creased property taxes to the developer, tax increment financing uses the tax
relief to subsidize the development of the area.

important difference between tax increment and tax abatement schemes
former, some of the risk is taken by the government, whereas
it is all taken by the investors. The risk taken is that the
property value increases will not materialize and the city will have to subsi
dize their share of improvement costs from general revenues. This risk is
greatest if the local government borrows the funds for improvement with a
general obligation issue and earmarks the tax increments for repayment of the
A less risky approach
is to borrow with a (more costly) revenue bond (a
debt.
tax allocation bond) and specify that any repayment shortfalls from property
tax increments will be made up with special assessments.
While this shifts
the risk away from the public sector, it also lowers the potential return to

is

yjr

An

under the
￼ chat
under the latter

the

investors.

Tax increment financing raises many of the same problems as tax abate
ments, and a few new ones.
Since it works only when the project transforms a
district into a higher property value district, one wonders
the subsidy is
really necessary to induce the project.
it is not, then the whole amount
of the tax increment may be viewed as a general revenue cost to the local
Moreover, the total fiscal cost to the local government probably
government.
exceeds the subsidized public investment portion since public services (e.g.,
police and fire protection) will likely have to be upgraded in the project
Finally, there are the problems related to borrowing.
area.
General obliga
tion issues use up a part of the government's allowable debt. Revenue bonds
are costly in the market and require substantial feasibility tests; hence,
they carry a heavy administrative and issuance cost.

If

if

financing in some
10/ For a review of the practice of tax increment
see "Tax Increment Financing," National Council for Urban Economic
Development Information Service, September 1975; and John Hulkonen, "Tax
Increment Financing: A Total Community Approach to Economic Development,"
AIDC Journal, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April 1974): 49-67.
states,
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General Tax

Relief

Local tax policy might also stimulate economic activity through general
An across-the-board reduction in local property taxation may low
tax relief.
er the relative cost of doing business for all firms in the local area.
Therefore, it could enhance the retention of existing firms as well as provide
Tax cuts, or at least contain
an inducement for new firms and expansions.
ment, may also have the advantage of improving the general "business climate."
This strategy, of course, is not without problems. The property tax losses
must somehow be made up, the tax reductions may be too small to have a notice
able effect on employment and even after reduction the tax rate in the reliefgranting jurisdiction may be higher than that in surrounding jurisdictions.

Perhaps these caveats are the reasons why general tax relief has not been
There is at least one
major technique used to induce industrial expansion.
exception.
New York State, in the period since 1975, has undertaken a con
certed effort to attract new industry to the State and to hold what it can of
of a series of State and
a declining
economic base.
The program has consisted
local tax abatement schemes in addition to a general program of reduction in
state government taxes.
Both the direct tax on corporate income and the per
The
sonal income tax have been reduced dramatically in the past few years.
effects of these reductions on economic development, however, are not yet
a

clear

.

There is another important implication of general tax relief for local
development. The coming years will likely see a continued
tax policy/economic
to enact general programs of tax relief, or at least
move by local governments
All such programs
to slow the rate of increase in local government taxes.
will not be State mandated or as extreme as California's propositions, but
Con
they will call for a rethinking of the role of tax incentive programs.
sider how local government fiscal policymakers are likely to deal with the
following questions: Should individuals or businesses benefit most from local
property tax reductions? If businesses "export" much of their tax costs, are
general business tax reductions a wise policy for a local government?
As less
tax money is available for general government purposes, can a local government
As the fiscal squeeze gets tighter,
afford economic development programs?
local governments will rethink their priorities, and more concrete evidence of

the

success of business

difficult

to

find.

tax

relief

programs

will

be

sought.

Such evidence

is

Metropolitan Tax Base Sharing
An interesting
local government fiscal program with potentially important
effects on the intrametropolitan distribution of economic activity is tax base
sharing. The most developed tax base sharing program, and the one which is
most studied, is Minnesota's Fiscal Disparities Act. 11/
This act covers seven
counties in the Minneapol is-St . Paul metropolitan area and provides for 40

11/ See, for example, "Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act:
Experience in Tax Base Sharing," Minnesota Law Review, LIX (April 1975):
927-63; Katherine Lyall, "Tax Base Sharing: A Fiscal Aid Toward More Rational

An
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percent of the post-1972 increase in commercial-industrial property tax base
This taxable capacity is then
to be transferred to a metropolitan authority.
shared according to population and relative fiscal capacity.
The plan has the advantage of reducing the potential interjurisdictional
competition for business; i.e., it limits the possibilities for using local
tax policy for local economic development. Yet in a broader sense it may be

economic development measure in that it may improve the general
by reducing fiscal disparities and promoting a more orderly
The effectiveness of such a program must ultimately depend
growth pattern. 12/
on its magnitude, and the Minnesota experiment does not involve a large share
of metropolitan local government revenues.
an

effective

business

climate

Structural

Reforms

Property tax reductions on business to induce new investment may also be
Structural changes in local taxes may result
reforms.
by structural
in increasing the attractiveness of an area for the location or expansion of a
plant. Two types of reform which may stimulate business investment are reduc
tion in the nonresidential component of the property tax, and movement toward
a differentially lower tax rate on land.
Some states have classified property
tax systems whereby nonresidential properties are assessed at a higher per
centage of market value than are residential properties.
The move to a uni
form assesment, as has been proposed in some states, would shift some of the
property tax burden off business and onto the residential sector. Whether
this reform would make an area more cost-competitive depends on the amount of
property tax reduction and on one's view of whether nonresidential property
A similar,
taxes are ultimately paid by owners of capital or by consumers.
important structural decision is the treatment of capital equipment under the
If capital equipment and inventories are heavily taxed, the
property tax.
Some 5
area will be especially uncompetitive for certain types of firms.
achieved

years ago, the State of Wisconsin took an important step toward improving
competitiveness by reducing its heavy property taxation of equipment and
machinery .
Some would

argue

that

the property

its

tax is seriously flawed in that it
If only land were
to property . 13/

penalizes investment by taxing improvements

Planning," AIP Journal, XLI (March 1975): pp. 90-100;
and Gene Knoff , "Tax Base Sharing:
An Assessment of the
Minnesota Experience," unpublished (Rutgers University, April 1977).
11/ (Cont'd) Land Use
and Andrew Reschovsky

same effect may result from court-mandated programs to equalize pub
service levels. For an excellent review of such programs, see Robert
Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld, "The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity,"
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 8 (June 1979):
pp. 1662-1750.

12/ The

lic

for example, Arthur Becker, "Principles of Taxing Land and
for Economic Development," in Land and Building Taxes (Madison,
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969 ) : pp . 11-48 .
13/

See,

Buildings

-
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taxed, there would be no disincentives to new construction, and speculators
holding land vacant or in suboptimal uses would be penalized. In effect, the
rate of return on a new physical investment is increased, since the total
property tax remains the same irrespective of the kind of improvement that is
on the land.
Land or site value taxation is not a new idea — Henry George
extolled its virtues one hundred years ago — yet site value taxation has not
been used to any
Some

significant

degree

in the United States

.

14/

Pennsylvania cities, notably Pittsburgh, have experimented with
higher rate on land than improvements but the usage has not

differentially

a

spread.
Land value

property

raises

taxation is potentially

a

powerful

device

for stimulating

it isn't likely to become widely used
of political problems and there are assessment

investment,

but

as

such.

It

problems which
Mostly, the constraint
are extremely difficult (though possible) to resolve.
to using site value taxation is that it would call for a revamping of the
Institutions as entrenched as the property
whole U.S. property tax system.
tax simply don't change easily, and certainly not at the initiation of local
governments .
a

number

Indeed, no structural change in the local property tax is easily made.
is important to recognize that while the property tax is a local tax and
rates and assessment are largely local matters, the general structure and
limits of the tax are laid down by state law. Local government, acting uni
laterally, cannot make important structural changes in the property tax.

It

Another kind of structural reform might involve relying more heavily on
Full cost recovery of
user or benefit charges to finance public services.
tolls,
fares,
provided
bus
services
garbage fees, recreational ad
by
highway
fees,
special
and
property
assessments
licenses is among the examples.
mission
general
strategy
This
lowers the
tax rate and can result in a more efficient
pattern of service use, and probably restrains budget growth. On the other
hand, too much use of benefit financing may exclude the low income from using
some services, and hence may not improve the business climate in the long run.

It

is practiced in Australia,

New Zealand and many developing coun
tax systems in most developing countries make some
provision for a differential tax treatment of land and improvements, and prop
erty investment incentives are commonplace.
These practices are reviewed in
Roy Bahl, "The Practice of Urban Property Taxation in Less Developed Coun
tries," in The Taxation of Urban Property in Less Developed Countries, ed. by
University of Wisconsin Press, 1979 ) .
Roy Bahl (Madison, Wisconsin:

14/

tries.

Indeed,

property
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IV.

Ideally,
effect urban

THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF LOCAL

TAX

POLICIES

would examine the results of past uses of local taxation to
economic development in attempting to develop a workable tax
policy strategy for local governments.
From the wealth of experience with
using tax abatements and incentives, surely there must be a direct answer to
the three important questions: (a) do such tax policy devices attract new
jobs?
(b) under what circumstances do which tax policy devices work best?
Unfortunately, the
and (c) do revenue impacts outweigh expenditure impacts?
answers are not so easy to come by.
The effects of tax incentive programs are
not easily separated from the effects of many other factors — e.g., changes in
Indeed, a
other costs of doing business and changing consumer preferences.
generally accepted method for isolating tax policy effects has not been de
Naturally, this leads to endless and fruitless debates about whether
veloped.
local governments should lower taxes to induce job increases. The fiscal im- »
In short, there is a
pact issue has also been debated but not resolved.
wealth of experience with local tax policy to stimulate economic development,
but a paucity of evidence about the success.
one

The questions posed in this paper call for a focus on local government
tax policies — tax abatement programs, tax increment financing, and specific
cases of general tax relief and structural tax changes. Unfortunately, the
literature on this subject has more often considered the effects of taxation
in general on industry location.
This literature is reviewed in the next
section. We turn then to a review of the meager evidence on the fiscal and
job generation impacts of the kinds of schemes discussed above.

Taxation

and

Industry Location

A tax incentive lowers the cost of doing business in the area offering
incentive; hence it is a positive factor in a firm's location decision.
All analysts are in agreement on that point. The issue is whether such ef
fects can be large enough to make a difference.
After all, state and local
government taxes on business are a small proportion of total costs, they are
deductible from Federal income tax liability, and local governments account
for a small share of such taxes in any case. Yet even small cost differences
may be important enough to influence location decisions, especially if profit
margins are narrow and especially within regions where taxes vary more than
other factor costs.

the

The research on this subject has rarely addressed the very difficult
of the effect of a tax change, but has instead concentrated on whether
higher vs. lower taxes make a difference.
The consensus of a great deal of
such research would seem to be that taxes are not a major factor in interre
gional location, but may be a major factor in intrametropol itan location de
cisions.^/ Yet some high taxing states — such as New York — may be exceptions

issues

•

15/ For

Federal

The Rand

a

recent

Policies:

literature survey,

Volume

II,

Corp., June 1977).

Economic
See

also

-

see Vaughan, The Urban Impacts of
Development (Santa Monica, California:
Roger Schmenner, The Manufacturing
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this pattern because of an inordinately high level of
tively progressive tax structure.

to

taxes)
order

tives

and

a

rela

do bias location decisions, three reasons might be
taxes on business (corporate income and property
lower the return to capital and cause firms to seek locations else
Second, high personal taxes force industry to bid up its wage rate in
to attract labor, and third, high personal taxes on high income execu
bias the location decisionmakers against some locations.

To

offered.
where.

taxes

the extent

taxes

First, direct

is

evidence that direct taxes on business influence location
major reason is that the variation among states in the
effective rate of direct taxes is quite small relative to other elements of
Moreover, relative to other costs,
the total cost structure of the firm. 16/
the variation in state business taxes is not that great.
Cornia, Testa, and
J3tocker present interstate comparisons to show that while business taxes per
$100 of corporate profits vary by about $25 across the 50 states (from New
York's high of $33), nonagricultural wages per $100 of profit vary by $250.17/
They properly conclude that it would require a sizable tax disparity to offset
such dissimilar wage rates.
Anyway, the savings made at the State or local
government level from the tax holiday are eventually taxed at the Federal
level; i.e., if a local tax abatement raises profits by $1,000, the Federal
The point here is that
Government may immediately realize a $500 windfall. 18/
the savings to the firm may be less than the revenue sacrifice made by the
There

decisions.

locality

no

The

.

is that high personal taxes — wages, income, and resi
—
to bid up wage rates, hence raising
dential property
may require employers
This would, cet . par., discourage loca
the relative cost of doing business.
tion within the area. While this conclusion might be true, the increased cost
More
among regions.
may be minimal when compared to other cost differentials
over, wages may not respond to increased taxes.
If taxes do have an influence
via labor costs, it is not likely to be more than a secondary influence.
A

second

argument

The argument

15/

(Cont

1

d)

(Cambridge, Mass.:

that high taxes

high income executives

on

bias choices

Evidence From Cincinnati and New England
School and Harvard-MIT Joint Center for

Location Decision:

Harvard Business
Urban Studies, March 1978).

16/ For evidence on the relatively small size of taxes, see Bennett
and Sandra Kanter, "The Political Economy of State 'Job Creation'
Business Incentives," Revitalizing the Northeast, editors, G. Sternlieb and
Hughes, Center for Urban Policy, 1978.

Harrison

J.

Cornia, William Testa and Frederick Stocker, State-Local
Incentives and Economic Development, Academy for Contemporary
Problems, Urban and Regional Development Series, No. 4, June 1978, p. 7.
17/ Gary

Financial

18/ For a discussion of this point, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
"Are State and City Corporate Income Taxes Stifling Investment in New York
City?", Quarterly Review (Winter, 1978-79), pp. 41-48.
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locations is more persuasive, at least on the sur
the extreme case as an example, the 1974 state-local gov
ernment personal tax burden on a family with a $50,000 income in New York
State was 15 percent of adjusted gross income, nearly twice the national av
erage of 7.8 percent and highest in the nation. 20/ On the surface, this dis
parity would seem to provide a substantial disincentive.
However, these esti
mates by the ACIR make no adjustment for the Federal tax offset, i.e., the
deductibility of state-local government taxes from Federal taxable income.
Hence, an executive in the 50 percent marginal income tax bracket shifts 50
percent of New York's higher taxes onto the Federal Government.
The higher
the income of the executive, the greater his influence on the location
decision and the smaller the percentage of New York's higher taxes that he
must ultimately pay.
As a result, the difference in effective tax rates on
high income taxpayers is considerably less than a comparison of effective
rates would suggest.
For most states, where income taxes are much less
severe, the high-taxed-executive influence is much less important.
against

face. 19/

some
To

high taxing
take

expected to have more of an effect on intrametropolitan
Central cities with high tax rates may be substantially
disadvantaged relative to their suburbs, especially if some of these suburbs
are in other (lower taxing) states.
While the literature in general seems to
show little if any association between taxes and intrametropolitan location
decisions , 21/ at least one study for New York City reached the opposite con
Grieson, et al . , concluded that manufacturing employment in New York
clusion.
City did respond to increases in business tax rates, but they found no similar
evidence for non-manufacturing employment.
There is no clear conclusion to be
drawn from the literature on the locational effects of taxes.
Because of
their small size relative to other costs, it seems safe to believe taxes are
Yet, at the margin, they may
not the major determinant of a location choice.
well be an important deterrent to locations in some high taxing jurisdictions.
In fact, Oakland has shown that intrametropolitan property tax differentials
This would seem a
may equal as much as 10 percent of a firm's profits . 22/
Taxes

might

location choices.

be

of this effect, see J. Thomas Romans and Ganti Subrah
Taxes, Transfers and Regional Economic Growth," Eco
nomic Discussion Series, No. 364, State University of New York at Buffalo,
19/ For one version
"State Government

Manyam,

December 1976.

Relations (ACIR), Signifi
20/ Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
cant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1976-1977, Vol.
Revenue and Debt
ACIR, March 1977):
(Washington, D.C.:
p. 45.

II

21/ A careful
tax consideration,
From

Cincinnati

and

analysis of the firm location decision process, including
in Schmenner, The Manufacturing Location Decision: Evidence
New

England.

A
22/ William Oakland, "Local Taxes and Intra-Urban Industrial Location:
Survey," in Metropolitan Finance and Growth Management Policies, ed. by George
Break (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) .
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sizeable deterrent. Fox also reached the conclusion that fiscal considera
tions affected location choices in a study of the Cleveland area . 23/
Wasylenko has found that property tax rate differentials were an impor
tant determinant of firm relocation in the Milwaukee area in the wholesale
trade and manufacturing sectors but not for retail trade or services . 24/

Local Tax Policy Changes
There simply aren't definitive estimates of how specific local tax policy
changes — e.g., specific abatement programs — have affected employment and in
vestment or what their fiscal impact has been.
Some evidence from case stud
ies, though often anecdotal, suggests a positive economic and fiscal influence
of tax incentive measures.
As will be noted below, such results should be
considered with great caution.
They are often the result of studies carried
used is suspect
out by proponents of abatement schemes, the study methodology
and usually deals only with a part of the effects,
and every project-case
is

sufficiently

have read the
impact

little

Employment

make generalizations very difficult.
Other analysts
of abatement schemes in a quite different way — as having
job generation and uncertain effects on the local budget.

different to
impact
on

Effects

A superficial indication of the success of tax abatement programs is the
extent to which they are used. Two examples of the success of abatements
which have been recently cited 25/ are:
(a) the city of Grand Rapids granted
20 tax abatement certificates under Michigan's Act 255, for a $23 million
total investment and 208 new jobs; in total, nearly 100 abatement certificates
have been granted in Michigan;
(b) since New York City's program began in
1976, it is reported that 184 projects have been undertaken, accounting for
Ohio's impacted area program has been in exis
$947 million and 34,000 jobs.
tence since 1973, but only 7 applications have been received by the city of
Kansas City, Missouri's, 20-year experience with a blighted
Cleveland.
area abatement program has included more than 1.2 million square feet of of
fice space, 350,000 square feet of office area, 2,000 dwelling units, 1,200
hotel/motel units and an investment of $200 million. 26/

23/

Will

iam Fox,

pirical Evidence,"

"Fiscal Differentials

unpublished

manuscript,

and

Industrial Location:

Some

Em

1977.

24/ Michael Wasylenko, "The Role of Taxes and Fiscal Incentives in the
Location of Firms," in Urban Government Finances in the 1980' s, edited by
forthcoming).
Roy Bahl (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications,
25/

"Report

mission, Detroit

on

Act 255," submitted to City of Detroit,
26, 1979).

(July

26/ Darwin Daicoff
Kansas

,

City Planning

Com

Analysis of the Tax Abatement Aspects of
Project (The University of Kansas, June

An Economic

City Urban Redevelopment

1979).
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studies make no attempt to estimate the net employment effects; hence
Moreover, they simply as
the effect on jobs and investment.
overstate
they
responsible
bidding
was
for
the new investment
that
the
incentive
sume
into
from
is
far
true
suggested
That this may be
the local area.
by the New York
City case. Schroeder and Blackley have shown that few of New York City's
abatement projects are in the manufacturing sector (14.5 percent of the proj
ects and less than 2 percent of total investment) .27/ Office building con
struction (66 percent of the total abatement) and hotels (17 percent) were the
major beneficiaries. Moreover, most of the construction was in new projects
In light of the recent office
and most of the locations were in Manhattan.
space and hotel room shortages in Manhattan, it is not at all clear that the
Such

abatements
An

were necessary.

analysis of the applicants for Cleveland's abatement program shows a
been for downtown projects, primarily
have argued that because of an exist
would have located downtown in any

similar pattern. All applications have
Some
new office building construction.
ing shortage of office space these firms
case

and

the

abatement

program was

an

unnecessary giveaway

.

28/

In more carefully done and specific studies of the Kansas City and St.
Louis projects, Daicoff and Murdock seem to have found positive economic
effects. 29/ In a survey of Act 353 developers, there was unanimous agreement
that they would not have undertaken the development in St. Louis without the
The abatement,
it was also shown, enabled the provision of first
abatement.
class office space 11 percent cheaper than would have been possible without
than comparable space in St. Louis
and therefore cheaper
the abatement,
It is argued that the result was to retain many firms that would have
County.
On the other hand,
the abatement program had a similar
been lost to the city.
effect in St. Louis as in New York City and Cleveland — it attracted office
building investment almost exclusively in the central business district.
Daicoff 's study of the Kansas City experience was careful, but not
Each project
conclusive as to the employment impact of abatement programs.
that the
He does conclude, however,
was too unique to draw a generalization.
project
clearing
blight
sites.
at
has
been
effective
in
program
redevelopment

Fiscal Impacts
The methodology

tive

used

to estimate

27/ Schroeder and Blackley,
Programs and Small Business

fiscal

impact

is primitive because of

"State and Local Government Locational Incen
in Region II."

28/ Susan Olsen, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives as a Means to Encourage
Investment," Cleveland City Planning Commission, April 1978.
29/

Daicoff,

"Unusual Missouri
1-8.

and Norman Murdock,
An Economic Analysis of Tax Abatement,
Renewal Law," Planners Notebook, Volume I, No. 2 (May 1971):

pp.

-
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A
the enormous complexity of isolating the separate effects of tax changes.
few studies have examined the fiscal impact of specific tax abatement pro
grams, though they vary widely in terms of the detail considered in the analy
Most of these studies do not
sis and the range of fiscal impacts considered.
impact, usually because
about
net
izable
conclusion
fiscal
general
a
produce
expenditure
limited
number
of
functions
and revenue
they considered a
sources . 30/

exceptions.

Hackbart and Morgan studied the costs and
benefits of property tax exemptions in seven states .31/ Taking into account
both employment leakages from the area and multiplier effects, they showed
that program costs can exceed benefits even when a substantial share of an
area's investment increase is attributable to the tax incentive.
There

are

a

few

More specific evidence is in Daicoff 's in-depth analysis of three tax
He
abatement programs in Missouri which shows a net positive fiscal impact.
cautions that the revenue and expenditure impacts are unique enough to require
case-by-case consideration. 32/ One would conclude from this qualification
Another study of
that the result of a positive impact cannot be generalized.
the Kansas City 353 Abatement Program finds the net subsidy to developers to
Of the seven projects to take advantage of Missouri's
be relatively low.
abatement law since 1960, only the large Crown Center project was granted full
Here the subsidy amounted to about $12,000 over the
property tax exemption.
entire 10-year abatement period as compared to a total private investment of
The study concludes that this subsidy appears to be quite
$140 million.

small . 33/

A St. Louis study has shown that the 353 Abatement Program results in a
positive revenue impact. This, however, is largely because the property
Property tax receipts
tax is a relatively minor - revenue source in St. Louis.
account for only about 8 percent of the city's total revenues as compared with

net

tax, 19 percent from the utilities tax and 11
25 percent from the earnings
percent from a sales tax.
Hence, the revenue loss due to the abatement is
easily made up by any job stimulus resulting from the program. However, no
account in this study is taken of the potential expenditure increase due to
30/ For

to Commercial

a

see Kathy Hayes,
"The Fiscal Impact of Tax Abatements
Industrial Firms," (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University,

review,
and

1980).
31/ W. Morgan and M. Hackbart, "An Analysis of State and Local
Tax Exemption Programs," Southern Economic Journal (October 1974).
32/
Kansas

Daicoff,

An Economic

City Urban Redevelopment

Analysis of the Tax Abatement Aspects of the
Corporation, 1979.

and Urban Development," National Council for Urban Economic
Information Service, October 1975.

33/ "States
Development

Industrial
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the

project.

increases

A

tended

Michigan
to

study of three communities showed how income tax
property tax losses due to a tax abatement . 34/

offset

Regrettably, the fiscal impact of abatement projects has not been a sub
ject carefully studied. The available evidence is too partial — in terms of
expenditure/revenue
impacts considered and cities studied — to carry any firm
conclusion.
Some

Concluding

Generalizations About the Use of Tax Incentives

While one cannot read this evidence to a conclusion that tax incentives
stimulate local economic development, two generalizations might be offered
they
The first is that if tax incentives are available,
with some certainty.
will be used, especially by large firms which are more able to handle the pa
perwork involved. The second is that tax incentives do improve the competi
All other generalizations are condi
tive position of the issuing government.
tional, i.e., it depends on whether....

If it

lowering of taxes does attract jobs and invest
of conditions which make the use of the abate
With respect to net job gains, an identical tax incen
ment more favorable.
in
tive will have a greater impact in a growing than a declining city because
the latter there will tend to be more job retention than net employment gain
and because in the declining city there is likely to be more excess capacity
ment,

then

is

that

assumed

there are

a

a

number

in the local service sector.

Another factor which will tend to offset the positive job impact of a tax
incentive program is the fragmentation of government within the metropolitan
If the city subsidizes a development project which attracts new jobs to
area.
the city, some of the impact of the project will be lost if workers reside in
For example, much of their shopping and certainly their
other jurisdictions.
property investments will take place outside the boundaries of the jurisdic
tions which subsidized the project.

likely

to make the fiscal
Again,
impact of an
more
workers tend to live
then prop
and shop outside of the jurisdiction which provided the incentive,
erty and sales tax revenues will be lost. From this, one might conclude that
the larger the geographic boundary of the governmental unit issuing the abate
ment, the greater the share of benefit from the abatement that will be cap
tured. A second principle is that the greater the non-property tax authority
of the governmental unit, the more likely it is to recapture the revenues lost
through the property tax subsidy.
the subsidized project actually does
create additional jobs, directly and indirectly, then the consumption and
earnings tax bases may rise by enough to offset the property tax abatement .

There also are

a

set of conditions which

abatement project

positive.

are

if

If

34/ Michigan Department of Commerce, Office of Economic Expansion, The
Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development District Law: An Evaluation
of Its Use and Economic Impact on Three Communities in Michigan (Lansing:
1978).
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possibility that an abatement program attracted
business and had a positive fiscal impact when instituted, but now is either
no longer necessary to attract jobs or has a negative fiscal impact.
How can
the local government determine when the program should be turned off?
The
problems with evaluating such programs make it impossible to define rigid cut
off criteria, but there are a few clues. At least in terms of whether the
Finally,

there is the

abatement is a necessary incentive for location, there are market signals.
A
booming period of office and hotel building activity in one section of the
city and/or very high occupancy rates probably means that the abatement has
become a pure giveaway — at least for that section of the city.
The opposite
reaction, no takers in other parts of the city, likewise suggests that the
Despite the ob
program is ineffective and ought to be scrapped or revised.
viousness of these points, many cities are characterized by abatement programs
which "work" for the construction of office space in thriving areas of the
city and not in the depressed areas.

In sum, there is a great deal yet to be learned about the potential im
pacts of changes in local government tax policy on local economic development.
Net employment impacts are uncertain as are net fiscal impacts.
Tax incentive
and abatement programs do seem to have worked in terms of their physical re
newal efforts — the reconstruction or rehabilitation of deteriorating areas.
Even if such renewal induces no net job increases or favorable short-run fis
cal impacts, it may be an economically viable proposition in terms of the
A decade hence,
a better repaired
long-term health of the city.
stock of
housing, plant, and infrastructure will be major comparative advantages.
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V.

RESEARCH

NEEDS

discussion above it is apparent that there are enormous gaps in
about the effects of tax incentives on local economic devel
It would seem fruit
opment and about the fiscal impact of these incentives.
this gap by re-asking the general question, "Do taxes
less to begin to
It seems pretty clear that the an
make a difference in industry location?"
swer is that they can within regions, where other costs do not vary so much.
Rather, it would seem more useful to begin to answer a more narrowly defined
set of questions which might improve our knowledge about how to use local tax
policy in stimulating economic development.
From the

our knowledge

fill

The

following might

Estimating Net Effects

on

be

suggested

Jobs

and

as

part of

a

research agenda:

Investment

the net effects on jobs
projects.
If
public
and investment of subsidized
a tax incentive which en
ables the expansion of a hotel creates new jobs, it may also eliminate jobs in
Through a series of comparative case study analyses, one
competitive firms.
ought to try and determine which kinds of subsidies have greater or lesser
displacement effects and in what kind of city /environment these displacement
effects are greater.
A methodology

needs

to be developed to estimate

vs. Job Attraction

Using Tax Incentives for Job Retention

use of tax abatements and other incentive devices for job retention
First, one would want to
the attraction of new jobs should be studied.
know the differential impact of a given subsidy for each of these two
Second, it would be useful to know how the subsidy itself could be
purposes.
The

versus

structured differentially to achieve a retention versus an attraction
objective.
It is not clear, from this literature, whether the kinds of
for expansion which are offered are the right package to hold
inducements
firms in the central city. It also would seem important for cities to develop
variable kinds of abatement programs which increase the subsidy during times
when

other

the

city's

comparative advantage

particularly

was

times.

Inducements

poor

and

reduce

it

in

to the Local Service Sector

Aside from estimating the net job- and investment-creating effects of a
subsidized project, there is need to develop a methodology to estimate what
induces local service employment and investment.
Under what conditions/
economic environment
can we expect the greatest increases in the local service
sector for a given job increase due to a subsidized project? What kind of
time lags might be expected in the creation of additional local service
employment?
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Revenue

Implications

of Tax Incentives

There needs to be a more complete analysis of the revenue implications of
various tax abatement schemes, including tax increment financing.
One needs
to know the direct and indirect effects on both personal and business taxes.
Furthermore, these effects need to be disaggregated according to the juris

diction which issues

the

benefit from the revenue
Expenditure

abatement

and

increase.

the

jurisdictions/taxing bodies

which

Impacts of Tax Incentives

Very little is known about the expenditure impacts of different kinds of
tax abatements or tax increment financing schemes.
Are additional expendi
ture requirements particularly severe on older cities which have an obsolete
infrastructure or on growing cities which are still catching up on the devel
opment

of their infrastructure?

Comparative Analysis of Federal, State

and

Local Tax Incentives

There is need for a serious piece of research which relates the various
incentives offered by the Federal, State, and local governments to stimulate
local economic development. It is patently clear that some of these incen
tives are reinforcing while others are offsetting. Which package of programs
might work best to stimulate the development of central city economies?

Redistribut ive Implications

of Tax Incentives

concern about the provision of incentives to de
or blighted areas.
There seems to be
little or no research which attempts to determine whether or to what extent
the benefits from such subsidized projects stayed within the impacted areas .
It seems likely that the ultimate beneficiaries of these subsidies, both in
terms of employment and capital' gains , were not the intended beneficiaries.
There needs to be a serious look at the redistributive implications of these
kinds of subsidized projects, particularly tax increment financing.
It may
well be that there is no intention for such programs to have any redistribu
tive effects, but in that case, one might want to rethink the designation of
blighted areas.
In any case the ultimate objectives of the project ought to
There

seems

velop the local

be

more

to

be much

economy

in impacted

clearly stated.
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